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II. OVERVIEW OF ENERGY PRICING
Abstract— In an open-access environment, transmission
constraints can result in different energy prices throughout the
network. These prices are dependent on a number of factors such
as the system load level, generating unit bid, demand unit bid,
network topology and security limits imposed on the
transmission network due to thermal, voltage and stability
considerations. Computing these energy prices at all buses in
large networks under given system operating conditions can be
time consuming. This paper describes some simple methodology
based on the computer programs to calculate saving , worth of
transmission transaction, market clearing price, social welfare,
transaction cost, locational marginal pricing, transmission
capacity cost at selected zones for a given period. These
information for energy prices can be used not only to improve
the efficient usage of power grid but also to design a reasonable
pricing structure of power systems or to provide economic
signals for generation or transmission investment.
Index Terms : Joint dispatch, power pool, worth of transmission
transaction, social welfare, market clearing price, bid price of the
seller, bid price of the buyer.

I. INTRODUCTION

E

LECTRIC power industry is under restructuring in
response to change in the law, technology, markets and
competitive pressures. The industry now includes companies,
selling unbundled power of rates set by competitive markets.
In this environment more competition will mean lower
rates for customers. With the separate pricing of generation
and transmission, it has become necessary to find the capacity
usage of different transactions happening at the same time so
that a fair use of transmission changes can be given separately
to individual customers. Reforms have been under taken by
introducing
commercial
incentives
in
generation,
transmission, distribution and retailing of electricity, with, in
many cases, large resultant efficiency gains.

Power pools came into existence as a reaction to
increasing prices of electricity. The objective was to reduce
the overall operating cost of utilities by sharing the cheaper
sources through multi-area joint dispatch. In multi area joint
dispatch all participating utilities co-ordinate to dispatch their
generation in a centralized manner. In certain instances, the
pool also co-ordinates the system expansion and maintenance
planning activities [1].
Two types of market settlement have been proposed for
adoption by the market operator: Maximization of social

welfare [2] and minimization of consumers payment [3]. In
first type the total cost is minimized by assuming that
generation bids correspond to their actual cost. The later
objective seeks to minimize the market clearing price and
hence the price of the customer would pay for energy.
Maximization of social welfare objective function to obtain
the optimum dispatch schedules has been the common practice
in most centralized power pools. Two cases may arise in the
class of problems. One where the market operator receives
both supply and demand bids and the system price (MCP) is
obtained by matching the highest priced cleared sell bid to the
lowest prices cleared buy bid, which is termed as double
auction power pool. The other is where only supply bids are
received and the system price is obtained by finding the
highest priced bid intersecting the system demand forecast.
This is known as single auction power pool. Presently there
are two pricing methods that are being used in a competitive
energy market to account for congestion: the uniform pricing
method and the non-uniform pricing method. In the first
method, all generators are paid the same price regardless of
their individual bids based on the bid of the marginal
generating unit that would be dispatched in the absence of
congestion. Such a bid is known as market clearing price
(MCP). In the second method, each generator is paid a price
based on the marginal cost of serving an increment of load at
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its location Such a price is
price (LMP). The LMP at a
marginal cost of supplying
energy at the bus without
limits.

referred as locational marginal
bus is defined as the minimum
the next increment of electric
violations of any transmission

III. CALCULATION OF MARKET CLEARING PRICE AND SOCIAL
WELFARE IN SINGLE AUCTION POWER POOL.

T

N

J = ∑∑ PBSi,K Pi,K + STi × USTi,k ……………….(5)
K =1 i =1

In (9) the index K denotes the bid time period i.e. half an hour
or one hour and T stands for the entire market scheduling
horizon. UST is a binary variable denoting the unit start up
decision, while ST represents start up price offer. .
The algorithm of the program used for market settlement in
single auction power pool is illustrated in Fig .2.

This section discusses the market settlement mechanism
where only gencos submit their bids that are then arranged in
the increasing order of the prices. The highest priced bid to
intersect with the system demand forecast determines the
market price which is illustrated in Fig. I.
MCP
CN
Load
forecast

C2
C1
B1

B2

P

Energy bid in MWh per hour
Fig.I . Market settlement in single auction power pool. Where the market
operator receives ‘N’ supply bid price (BPS) and demand forecast P.

The market operator seeks to minimize the system cost which
is effectively maximization of the social welfare [2] denoted
by the shaded area in figure I.
N

N

i =1

i =1

System cost J = ∑ BPS × Pi = ∑ fi (Pi ) …………..(I)
The above objective function is minimized subject to the
demand supply balance constraint, neglecting losses
N

∑P − P
i =1

i

D

= 0 …………………………………… (2)

We can formulate the Lagrangian as follows
N
⎛ N
⎞
F = ∑ fi (Pi ) − λ ⎜ ∑ Pi − PD ⎟ ……………………(3)
i =1
⎝ i=1
⎠
and the Kuhn-Tuckers condition of optimality is
dCi (Pi )
= λ ……………………………………..(4)
dPi
Incorporating unit commitment decisions the gencos are
required to submit a start up price bid in addition to the
variable component. Accordingly, the unit commitment
decisions are incorporated in the social welfare objective
function as follows;
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Start

Read : (i) Number of gencos (n)
(ii) Start up price (ST)
(iii) Bid price of the seller (BPSn)
(iv) Maximum power generation (Pgmax)
Evaluate generation offer price (GP)

=

S Tn + P g n m a x × B P S n
Pg n m a x

Arrange GP in ascending order with itE
corresponding generation

Set genco count n = 1

No

Is sum

B

Pg max ≥ Pd max

P

≤P

Is
Pgn max ≥ Pd max

Yes
th
Yes n genco is
selected

Pdma
x=Pg

No

MCP=
BPSn

Advance genco
count n = n+1

Social welfare =
Pdmax × MCP − Pgn × GPn
Is
Pngmax+Pgm
ax ≥ Pdmax

Yes

Genco nth,
(n+1)th are
selected

Pdmax=
Pgnmax+P
gn+1

MCP=BPSn+

No

Social welfare =

Pd max × MCP − Pgn max × GPn

−Pgn +1 × GPn +1

B

Stop
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Fig.2. Flow chart for market settlement in single auction power pool.
m

Social welfare =

J=

N

∑ P BPB − ∑ P.BPS
Dj

j =1

M

⇒J=

The market operator seeks to minimize the system cost which
is effectively maximization of social welfare [2] denoted by
the shaded area in fig. 3.

Bid price in $/MWh

Seller bid price
CN
Market clearing
price
Buyer bid
price
C1

i

i

N

j

i

i =1

∑ g (P ) − ∑ f (P ) ……………………………(7)
M

=

i =1

∑B − ∑ C
j =1

IV. CALCULATION OF MARKET CLEARING PRICE AND SOCIAL
WELFARE IN DOUBLE AUCTION POWER POOL
This section discusses the market settlement mechanism
where gencos as well as discos submit their bids. The gencos
bids are arranged in increasing order of the prices where as the
discos bids are arranged in decreasing order of the prices. The
system price and the amount of energy clearing for trading is
obtained from the intersecting point of these curves as shown
in Fig. 3.

j

j =1

N

j

Dj

i =1

i

i

A demand supply balance constraints, neglecting losses, need
to be included as follows,
N

M

∑P = ∑P
i =1

i

j =1

Dj

………………………………………..(8)

Formulating the Lagrangian for the maximization problem
described by (11) and (12), we have
M
N
N
⎛ M
⎞
F = ∑ g j (PDj ) − ∑ fi (Pi ) − λ ⎜ ∑ PDj − ∑ Pi ⎟ ………..(9)
j =1
i =1
i =1
⎝ j=1
⎠
Applying the Kuhn-Tuckers condition of optimality, we can
write
⎫
d ⎡⎣g j (PDj ) ⎤⎦
=λ ⎪
⎪
dPDj
⎬ ……………………..(10)
d ⎣⎡ fi (Pi ) ⎦⎤
⎪
and
= λ⎪
dPi
⎪⎭
The Lagrange multiplier ‘ λ ’ denotes the system
marginal price.
The algorithm of the program used for the market settlement
in double auction power pool is illustrated in Fig.4.

Energy bid in MWh per hour

Cleared gencos
& discos

Uncleared
gencos & discos

Fig.3 Market settlement in double auction power pools, where the market
operator receives ‘N’ supply bids with bid price (BPS) from the participating
genco and ‘M’ demand sides from the customers with bid price (BPB)

We can assume that BPS represents a genco’s true marginal
cost while BPB represents a customer’s true benefit or utility
function.
We can thus write ;
Ci = fi ( Pi ) , B j = g j (PDj ) ; ∀i ∈ N & ∀j ∈ M ……….(6)
In (10) Ci is the cost function of genco ‘i’ expressed as
function power supplied Pi, while Bj is the benefit function of
customer ‘j’ as a function of the power demand PDj.
The social welfare function ‘J’ can be defined as the
difference of total customer benefit and total cost of genco.
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Start

Read : (i) Start-up price = ST
(ii) Bid prices of sellers = BPSn
(iii) Bid prices of buyers= BPBm
m

(iv) Maximum demand =

∑P

dmaxm

n =1

N

∑P

(v) Maximum generation =

n =1

gmaxn

(vi) Number of gencos=N
(vii) Number of buyers = M

Arrange BPS in ascending order with
corresponding generations and BPB in descending
order with their corresponding demands

Evaluate generator offer price
S.Tn + Pngmax × BPSn
GPn =
Pngmax
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Evaluate average BPS = (BPS)av
N

=

∑ GP

× Pgmax M

M

M=1

N

∑P

M=1

gmax M

Set m = 1

Is
(BPS)av<BPBm

No

Demand
bids are
not
cleared

Yes

A`

A

Advance demand
count m = m +1

A`

Is
(BPS)av<(
BPB)m+1

C

No

Only mth
demand
bid is
cleared

Yes
C

Evaluate total load
cleared

B

Set n =1
No

Is
(PBS)av
> GPn

Gencos are
not cleared

A

yes
Advance genco
count n = n+1
No
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Is (PBS)av
> GPn+1

Only nth genco
is cleared

yes

Evaluate total generation
cleared=total load cleared

Evaluate market clearing price =either lowest
BPB of the cleared load or highest BPS of
cleared genco which is higher

Evaluate social welfare =
Disco purchase –genco
sale

A

Stop

International Journal of Computer and Communication Technology (IJCCT), ISSN: 2231-0371, Vol-4, Iss-2

80

Assessment Of Market Clearing Price And Social Welfare In A Competitive Electricity Market

CASE STUDIES
To illustrate the validity of the proposed
methodology based on the computer program,6 gencos
and seven discos power pool has been studied.

23.3500 30.5900 28.2500 27.7500 23.5000 22.6000
20.3000
Columns 8 through 9 33.0000 27.2000
pdmaxgeneral = 250 350 500 450 200 350 400 500
MaximumDemand_MaximumGeneration = 2500
2400
averageBidPrice_Genco = 24.3167

Results for Single Auction
gencos = 6
discos = 7
st =
Columns 1 through 6
1000
1500
750
500
100
1000
Column 7
900
bps = 20.5000 21.5000 25.5500 22.0000 27.5000
22.0000 24.5000
pgmax = 350 600 200 200 150 900 200 300
pdmax = 250 350 500 450 200 350 400 500

All_DISCO_bid_prices =
23.3500
30.5900
28.2500
27.7500
23.5000
22.6000
20.3000
Market_clearing_price_from_DISCOside = 27.7500
discoNUMBERScleared = 2 3 4
discoBPBcleared = 30.5900 28.2500 27.7500
discoNUMBERS_NOTcleared = 1 5 6 7
discoBPB_NOTcleared = 23.3500 23.5000 22.6000
20.3000
discoloadclearedMW = 350 500 450
sumDISCOloadMWcleared =
1300
ALL_GENCO_bps =
23.3571
24.0000
29.3000
24.5000
28.1667
23.1111
gencoofferingBPS = 23.1111 23.3571 24.0000
genco_numbers_loadsharing = 6 1 2
gencoGENERATIONclearedMW = 900 350 50
gencoTOTALgenerationMW =
1300
SOCIAL_WELFARE =
7144

MaximumDemand_MaximumGeneration = 2500
2400
avbps = 24.3167
TOTAL_DISCO_load( should be < SumPDmax )= 2000
ALL_GENCO_bps =
23.3571
24.0000
29.3000
24.5000
28.1667
23.1111
market_clearing_price_mcp_from_GENCO_side_only =
24.5000
sumDISCOloadMW =
2000
gencoofferingBPS = 23.1111 23.3571 24.0000 24.5000
genco_numbers_loadsharing = 6 1 2 4
gencoGENERATIONclearedMW = 900 350 600 150
gencoTOTALgenerationMW =
2000
SOCIAL_WELFARE =
47050
gencosale1 =
20800
gencosale2 =
8175
gencosale3 =
14400
gencosale4 =
3675
gencosale5 =
0

VII. CONCLUDING REMARKS
The electricity power industry is undergoing vast changes
in many parts of the world. Restructuring of the industry
involves a transition from natural monopolies, with
centralized planning to markets that are subjected to
competition. The method of assessment will be a valuable tool
to power system operators in determining saving cost, worth
of transaction, market clearing price, transaction cost,
locational marginal pricing, transmission capacity cost in a
competitive energy market under different operating
conditions.

-----------------------------------------------------------------Results for Double Auction
gencos = 6
discos =
7
stgeneral = Columns 1 through 6
1000
1500
750
500
Column 7
900

100

bpsgeneral = 20.5000 21.5000 25.5500 22.0000
27.5000 22.0000 24.5000
pgmaxgeneral = 350 600 200 200 150 900 200 300
bpbgeneral = Columns 1 through 7

1000
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